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COMMENT
THE IRAN CASES-EXECUTIVE
INTERVENTION IN PRIVATE LITIGATION
American corporations and financial institutions are conducting an in-
creasing amount of business with foreign governments.' A private firm's
interaction with a foreign sovereign 2 differs substantially from commercial
transactions with foreign corporations or citizens of another country. The
primary reason for this distinction is that the doctrine of sovereign immunity
affords states absolute discretion in their affairs, unhampered by the laws of
other states. 3 This doctrine of sovereignty, recognized under both Ameri-
can 4 and international law,5 extends immunity to a sovereign from suit in its
own courts as well as in the courts of another nation. Absent a government's
waiver of immunity, Americans doing business with a foreign sovereign have
only that government's honesty and good faith as assurance that it will fulfill
its contractual obligations.
During the 1960's and 1970's, many American firms entered into contracts
with Iran, trusting the reputation of Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi. Many
of these businesses fell victim to contract repudiation and asset expropriation
during the Iranian revolution. 6 As a result, more than 400 lawsuits were
filed by American nationals damaged by the revolution and the policies of
the new regime. 7 The settlement of these cases was complicated, however,
by President Carter's actions in response to the seizure of the American
embassy in Tehran, Iran. Initially, the President ordered that all Iranian
1. D. Cohen, Some Problems of Doing Business with State Trading Agencies, in INTERNA-
TIONAL TRADE, INVESTMENT, AND ORGANIZATION 186-87 (W. LaFave & P. Hay eds. 1967). See
H.R. REP. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 6, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
6604, 6605 [hereinafter cited as HOUSE REPORT ON FSIA] (American citizens are increasingly
coming into contact with foreign states as foreign enterprises are everyday participants in
commercial activity).
2. A sovereign is an independent government which is vested with supreme authority over a
state. L. OPPENHEIM, OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 118-19 (H. Lauterpacht 8th ed. 1955).
3. J. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 8-9 (6th ed. 1963) [hereinafter cited as BRIERLY]. The
doctrine of sovereignty was formulated by philosopher Jean Bodin in 1576 and has evolved to
mean that the sovereign government has absolute dominion within its own state. Id. at 7-16.
4. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (1976). Under this
Act, a foreign state is immune to the jurisdiction of United States courts, with only certain
limited exceptions. Id. § 1604.
5. See BRIERLY, supra note 3, at 243 (foreign sovereign's immunity is customary in interna-
tional law).
6. A. SAIIDL, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE SHAH 182-84 (1980) [hereinafter cited as THE RISE
AND FALL OF THE SHAH]; JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE, 96TH CONG., 1ST SESs., ECONOMIC
CONSEQUENCES OF THE REVOLUTION IN IRAN 5-10 (Comm. Print 1979) (a compendium of papers
submitted by B. Reich) [hereinafter cited as ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE REVOLUTION].
7. Nat'l L.J., March 23, 1981, at 7, col. 2.
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assets in the United States be "frozen." 8 The regulations issued pursuant to
this order prohibited final disposition of the lawsuits filed by American
nationals, except in certain limited situations.9 Subsequently, President
Carter signed the Iran Accords10 which lifted the "freeze" on Iranian assets
but stayed all judicial proceedings and nullified all judicial attachments of
Iranian property. Further, the Accords established a separate tribunal to
determine the validity of claims by American nationals.
The Iran cases provide the first significant opportunity to test the effect of
two statutes governing the interaction of American businesses with a foreign
government: the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA)," which
sets forth the circumstances under which a foreign government can be sued
in United States courts, and the 1977 International Emergencies Economic
Powers Act (IEEPA),' 2 which allows the President to intervene in disputes
between American creditors and foreign governments in emergency situa-
tions. 3  The Iran cases exemplify the inherent conflict between these two
statutes.
This Comment examines the nature of the Iran cases and the treatment
received by American plaintiffs under the FSIA. Additionally, to gain a
better understanding of how the two federal statutes interact, IEEPA and its
historical counterpart are presented. Finally, the legitimacy of the broad
power claimed by the President in freezing Iran's property, suspending cases
properly before United States courts, and nullifying judicial attachments of
Iranian assets is analyzed. Understanding the struggle between the executive
and judicial branches to exert control over claims by American businesses
against foreign sovereigns is essential for an accurate evaluation of the risk
involved in contracting with foreign governments. Excessive intervention by
a President undermines the ability of American businesses to evaluate that
risk.
SOURCE OF THE CONTROVERSY
During a visit to Tehran, Iran, on December 31, 1977, President Carter
described Iran as "an island of stability in one of the more troubled areas of
the world."' 14 Though hindsight reveals the irony of that observation, Iran
8. The freeze prohibited Iranian assets from being withdrawn from the United States or
from branches of United States banks in other countries. Exec. Order No. 12170, 3 C.F.R. 457
(1981), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (Supp. III 1979).
9. Iranian Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 535.101-.904 (1980).
10. The Iran Accords constitute the agreement between the United States and Iran which
provided for the release of American hostages held in Tehran in exchange for the release of
Iranian assets from the United States. See note 72 infra.
11. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (1976).
12. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706 (Supp. III 1979).
13. Id. § 1702. In examining the IEEPA, reference to its predecessor, the Trading With the
Enemy Act, 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-,44 (1976 & Supp. III 1979), is pertinent. See notes 73-96 and
accompanying text infra.
14. United States Policy Toward Iran: Hearings on Foreign Affairs before the Subcomm. on
Europe and the Middle East of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 28
1981] THE IRAN CASES 625
was then considered a trusted ally with whom the United States had devel-
oped extensive commercial ties.' 5 The regime of Shah Mohammed Reza
Pahlavi used oil revenues to purchase American technology, services, and
manufactured products.' The rapidity of the Shah's modernization pro-
gram, for which he engaged American firms in numerous and substantial
commitments, was surpassed only by his successor's crusade to "de-western-
ize."1 7 Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini endorsed the ideology that Iran could
rid itself of the evils of western civilization only by disposing of all that was
American. 8 Nationalization of the Iranian industries that had not already
been consumed by the economically devastating revolution, was swiftly
accomplished by the new government."9 As hostility grew between Iran and
the United States, fueled by the seizure of the United States embassy in
Tehran, 20 Iran prepared to withdraw an estimated eight to twelve billion
dollars from American banks. 21 American creditors that had not already
filed suit did so, fearing that Iran eventually could be successful in removing
its funds and assets from the United States. 22
(1979) (statement by Lee H. Hamilton, quoting President Carter) [hereinafter cited as House
Comm. Hearings].
15. See ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE REVOLUTION, supra note 6, at 6-7.
16. Id. at 11 (Iran exported over 2.7 billion dollars worth of goods to the United States and
imported over 3 billion dollars worth of goods and services in 1977).
17. Id. at 223-24.
18. THE RISE AND FALL OF THE SHAH, supra note 6, at 165.
19. See Getz, Enjoining the International Standby Letter of Credit: The Iranian Letter of
Credit Cases, 21 HARV. INT'L L.J. 189, 211-12 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Getz] (the rapidity of
the economic dilapidation forbade a timely withdrawl of American interests). The rapidity of
Iran's nationalization is exemplified by the following chronology. On May 5, 1979, Iran an-
nounced that all pending arms deals had been cancelled. On June 25, 1979, Iran nationalized all
banks. On July 5, 1979, Iran nationalized the steel, copper, aluminum, aircraft, shipbuilding,
automobile, and mining industries. ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE REVOLUTION, supra note 6,
at 223-24 (chronology of events prepared by Clyde R. Mark).
20. On May 19, 1979, Khomeini said he did not need the United States and on May 20, 1979,
Iran asked the United States to delay the arrival of the newly appointed ambassador to Iran.
ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE REVOLUTION, supra note 6, at 223-24. Iran's demonstration of
its intentions to put an end to long-standing political and commercial ties culminated when a
group of Iranian "students" seized the American embassy on November 4, 1979, with the
apparent approval of their government. New England Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Iran Power
Generation & Transmission Co., 502 F. Supp. 120, 122 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (court took judicial
notice of controversy).
21. See N.Y. Times, Nov. 15, 1979, at 16, col. 5 (midwest ed.).
22. Many of the Iran cases have been litigated in New York. See The Iran Agreements:
Hearings before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 72 (1981)
[hereinafter cited as The Iran Agreements] (one law firm represented plaintiffs in 107 lawsuits,
all before the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York). American
courts were obviously a more desirable forum for American plaintiffs due to the disarray of the
Iranian courts. Immediately after the revolution Iranian courts were in chaos. American Bell
Int'l, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 474 F. Supp. 420, 423 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). For a discussion
on the state of the judicial system in Iran see generally Ottley, The Revolutionary Courts of Iran,
4 N. ILL. U. INT'L L.J. 1 (1980).
In addition, Iran's disregard for international law made American courts preferrable. See
American Int'l Group v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 493 F. Supp. 522, 525 (D.D.C. 1980) (resort
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Three types of controversies underlie the numerous suits brought by Amer-
ican firms against Iran, its agencies, and instrumentalities. First, the revolu-
tion and civil strife in Iran made performance of many contracts for goods
and services difficult, if not impossible, for both sides, thus forcing the
failure of most contracts.2 3  Also, the revolutionary government in Iran
repudiated contracts that did not suit Islamic ideology and was reluctant to
compensate the companies that had partially performed. 24 A second group
of lawsuits was triggered by the new government's decision to nationalize
Iran's economy. This nationalization policy resulted in the expropriation or
conversion of American assets without compensation to the owners. 25
to Iran's courts would be futile); concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in
Tehran, [1980] I.C.J. 3 (Iran violated international law by allowing American diplomatic
personnel to be taken captive).
23. The danger to United States employees in Iran forced their withdrawal from that
country and subsequently prevented American companies from performing their contracts with
the Iranian government. Getz, supra note 19, at 212. Cf. PRICE WATERHOUSE & CO., PRIcE
WATERHOUSE INFORMATION GUIDE-DOINc BUSINESS IN IRAN 10 (1975) (Prior to the revolution,
Iran's government had encouraged foreign investment); House Comm. Hearings, supra note 14,
at 29 (radical change in official Iranian policy to "anti-Americanism" took American business
concerns as well as the American government by surprise).
24. See National Airmotives Corp. v. Government of Iran, 499 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1980)
(no recourse for American company seeking payment of debt pursuant to contract with Iranian
Government); E-Systems, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 491 F. Supp. 1294 (N.D. Tex. 1980)
(denial of payment for services rendered on Iranian aircraft); Behring Int'l, Inc. v. Imperial
Iranian Air Force, 475 F. Supp. 383 (D.N.J. 1979) (payment for services denied to international
commercial freight forwarder).
25. See American Int'l Group, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 493 F. Supp. 522 (D.D.C.
1980) (American insurance operations damaged by nationalization of industries in Iran), pro-
ceedings stayed on appeal, 657 F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Chicago Bridge & Iron Co. v. Islamic
Republic of Iran, 506 F. Supp. 981 (N.D. I11. 1980) (conversion of American company's equip-
ment, breach of contract and lost profits due to Iranian nationalization); Reading & Bates Corp.
v. National Iranian Oil Co., 478 F. Supp. 724 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (American plaintiff damaged
from Iranian conversion of oil rig equipment).
Though the right of a sovereign to take assets of a private institution or individual is
commonly accepted in international law, it is generally understood that adequate compensation
must be offered to the victimized property owner. J. TRUITr, EXPROPRIATION OF PRIVATE FOREIGN
INVESTMENT 18 (1974). Although there is some authority that condones a "taking" without
compensation when it is nondiscriminating and required by an overriding public purpose, that is
the minority position. BRIERLY, supra note 3, at 284-85. By treaty, Iran has agreed to observe the
property rights of foreign investors. Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Rights,
Aug. 15, 1955, United States-Iran, art. XI, 8 U.S.T. 899, 903, T.I.A.S. No. 3853 [hereinafter
cited as Treaty of Amity]. See also PRICE WATERHOUSE & CO., PRICE WATERHOUSE INFORMATION
GUIDE-DoING BUSINESS IN IRAN 10 (1975) (the Iranian government guaranteed fair compensa-
tion in the event of expropriation). Iran and most other nations in the world community voted
for a U.N. resolution requiring compensation for expropriated property. G.A. Res. 1803, U.N.
GAOR, Supp. 17, U.N. Doc. A/PV1193 (1962).
It would be inconsistent with Iran's recently adopted Islamic constitution to reverse its
previous position on expropriation. Bassiouni, Protection of Diplomats Under Islamic Law, AM.
J. INT'L L. 609, 614 (1980) (under the principle of "pacta sunt servanda" or the principle that
treaties are continually binding). The new Iranian constitution also recognizes the sanctity of
property. Id. at 626. Thus, Iran violated both international law and its own law by not
compensating American companies whose property it expropriated.
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A final category of suits arose out of the common demand by Iranian
entities for security in the form of standby letters of credit from American
firms with whom they did business.16  The crucial effect of these standby
letters of credit was that the banks involved were required to pay the
Iranians on demand regardless of whether their American customers had
actually defaulted on their contractual obligations.2 7 Because Iran inappro-
priately demanded payment on some of the outstanding standby letters of
credit, and because further demands were expected after the President's
freeze was lifted,2" the American firms sought to enjoin the issuing American
banks from paying the nationalized Iranian banks. A number of American
courts granted "notice injunctions" requiring the banks involved to withhold
payment for a specified period, generally ten to twenty days after demand,
to give the American companies time to enjoin the transfer of funds to Iran. 9
26. The letter of credit is an instrument by which a bank, on behalf of its customer,
evidences to a third party (the beneficiary) a commitment to honor a demand for payment to
that third party so that the third party can more safely enter into a transaction with that bank's
customer. Getz, supra note 19, at 190. See U.C.C. § 5-103 (1978 version) (regulating letters of
credit under American law). On an international level, the standby letter of credit interposes an
additional bank into the transaction for added security. Getz, supra note 19, at 193-94. Typically
these transactions involved, as a third party, an Iranian entity that could demand payment from
an Iranian bank. This bank, in turn, demanded payment from an American bank which would
then seek compensation from its American customer. Generally, the customer was an American
firm that had contracted with the Iranian entity. It was estimated that after the Iran Accords
were signed, that there were over $700 million in disputed letters of credit outstanding. IRANIAN
Asszrs LITIGATION REPORTER, Feb. 6, 1981, at 2,249 (M. Mealey ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited as
IALR].
27. White, Bankers Guarantees and the Problem of Unfair Calling, 11 J. MAR. L. & COM.
121, 125-27 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Bankers Guarantees]. Cf. U.C.C. § 5-114 (1978 version)
(issuer must honor demand for payment though goods may not conform to underlying contract).
For a discussion of the dilemma faced by the courts in the Iranian letter of credit cases, see
Becker, Standby Letters of Credit and the Iranian Cases; Will the Independence of the Credit
Survive? 13 U.C.C. L.J. 335 (1980); Gable, Standby Letters of Credit: Nomenclature Has
Confounded Analysis, 12 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 903 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Letters of
Credit]. Thus, the American corporate customer would rely solely on the good faith of the
beneficiary, Iran, not to call the letters absent a default. Courts will interfere with payment of
standby letters of credit only in the exceptional case when the issuer of the letter of credit is able
to demonstrate deliberate fraud on the part of the beneficiary. Bankers Guarantees, supra, at
126.
The problems that arise when a firm issues a standby letter of credit to a foreign state'that
later experiences a revolution may be threefold. The new government may frustrate the initial
transaction, call in the letter of credit, or prevent the company from seeking remedy in the local
courts. Getz, supra note 19, at 210-11.
28. See, e.g., American Bell Int'l, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 474 F. Supp. 420, 422
(S.D.N.Y. 1979) (payment demanded by Iranian entity even though American company had
partially performed), proceeding stayed on appeal, No. 79-7527 (2d Cir. Aug. 14, 1979). See also
Letters of Credit, supra note 27, at 933-34 (civil unrest in Iran and statements by Iranian officials
gave rise to legitimate fears of further attempts at unwarranted letter of credit redemptions).
29. E.g., KMW Int'l v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 606 F.2d 10, 17 (2d Cir. 1979) (three day
notice required before payment to Iran); Stromberg-Carlson Corp. v. Bank Melli Iran, 467 F.
Supp. 530 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (10 day notice to American creditors required).
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All three types of controversies between American firms and Iranian agen-
cies and instrumentalities were brought pursuant to specific exemptions to
sovereign immunity within the FSIA.30 Nevertheless, due to judicial reluc-
tance to interfere with foreign policy matters, it was necessary for claimants
to persuade American courts to exercise jurisdiction over the Iranian entities
in accordance with the Act.
SUING IRAN IN AMERICAN COURTS
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976
The FSIA provides guidelines under which a suit may be brought against a
foreign state in a United States district court. 31 The FSIA is a statutory
codification of the doctrine of sovereign immunity. This doctrine was first
recognized in 1812 by the United States Supreme Court in Schooner Ex-
change v. McFaddon.32 The Schooner Exchange Court held that acts of a
foreign government are not within the jurisdiction of United States courts. 33
After Schooner Exchange, the courts adopted the practice of relying on an
opinion from the State Department as to whether a particular sovereign was
immune from United States courts, or whether the case could be properly
heard. 34
Prior to the enactment of the FSIA, State Department "opinions" were the
determinative factor in the immunity decision. 35 Quite often, the decision
At least one court refused to grant a "notice injunction," however, because Iran had not yet
demanded payment, and the action was, therefore, untimely. Harris Corp. v. Bank Melli Iran,
No. 79 C 560 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 22, 1979). For cases in which Iran demanded payment and the
courts allowed payment to be made, see American Bell Int'l, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran,
474 F. Supp. 420 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), proceeding stayed on appeal, No. 79-7527 (2d Cir. Aug. 14,
1979); Balfour, Maclaine Int'l, Ltd. v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust, No. M-2787 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. Aug. 2, 1979). Furthermore, even those American plaintiffs that obtained "notice injunc-
tions" were not guaranteed eventual success, since it still would be necessary to demonstrate that
Iran was guilty of deliberate fraud.
30. 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (1976).
31. The FSIA definition of a foreign state includes agencies and instrumentalities of a foreign
government, as well as commercial enterprises owned and controlled by that government. Id.
§ 1603. See, e.g., Reading & Bates Corp. v. National Iranian Oil Co., 478 F. Supp. 724, 728 n.2
(S.D.N.Y. 1979) (action against state owned oil company).
32. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812). Napoleon had seized a ship owned by an American
citizen while the ship was on the high seas. An American brought suit against Napoleon while the
ship was on business in an American port. Id. at 117. Chief Justice Marshall stated that the
province of a nation to conduct its affairs without being subjected to the jurisdiction of another
country's courts is beyond dispute. The only exception, added the Chief Justice, was if the
foreign nation itself consented. Id. at 136. Therefore, since France had not consented to jurisdic-
tion, the French army ship then in Philadelphia was immune from the jurisdiction of United
States courts. Id. at 147.
33. Id. at 136.
34. See, e.g., Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 34 (1945) (according to State
Department opinion, the federal courts could exercise jurisdiction over a ship owned, but not in
possession of, Mexico); Ex parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 587 (1943) (State Department
opinion that the district court could not exercise jurisdiction over a steamship owned by Peru).
35. Note, Sovereign Immunity- Limits of Judicial Control- The Foreign Sovereign Immu-
nities Act of 1976, 18 HARV. INT'L L.J. 429, 431-32 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Judicial Control].
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would be based on the amount of political pressure the State Department
received from the foreign government in question. 36  As a result, the FSIA
was adopted to de-politicize the grant of immunity by giving the courts
authority to decide the conditions under which a foreign government would
be subject to the jurisdiction of the United States courts.3 7 The Act provides
specific exceptions to the general rule of sovereign immunity,3 8 thereby
establishing a definite framework from which a potential litigant can deter-
mine the amenability of a foreign government to the jurisdiction of an
American court.
Exceptions to Sovereign Immunity Under the FSIA
There are two major exceptions to the general rule of sovereign immunity
in federal courts. 39  Under section 1605 of the FSIA, a foreign state may
expressly or impliedly waive its immunity to jurisdiction. 40  In the 1955
Treaty of Amity between the United States and Iran, Iran impliedly waived
its immunity from jurisdiction in United States' courts. 41 Nevertheless,
Iran's revolutionary government sought to disavow their commitments under
the Treaty of Amity by claiming that the Shah's undertakings were not
binding on the new Islamic republic. 42 A change in governments, however,
Cf. Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 34 (1945) (practice founded upon State
Department policy upheld); Ex parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 587 (1943) (where
recognition by State Department was lacking, district court had authority to decide immunity
issue).
36. Judicial Control, supra note 35, at 436.
37. HOUSE REPORT ON FSIA, supra note 1, at 6604-06. See Jet Line Serv., Inc. v. M/V Marsa
El Hariga, 462 F. Supp. 1165, 1170-71 (D. Md. 1978) (determination of American courts'
jurisdiction to hear claims regarding foreign governments must be made without reference to
political considerations).
38. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1604-1607 (1976).
39. While there are other exceptions to sovereign immunity, they are not applicable to the
Iran cases. Other exceptions encompass foreign property taken in violation of international law,
rights in property acquired by the United States as a gift, or money damages sought from a
foreign government for injury due to tortious conduct. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3)-(5) (1976).
40. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1)(1976).
41. Treat), of Amity, supra note 25, art. XI, para. 4, 8 U.S.T. at 909. The waiver of
immunity in the Treaty is sufficient to grant personal jurisdiction over Iranian defendants,
provided that the "minimum contacts" requirement for in personam jurisdiction is met. Thus,
whether the waiver of immunity is operative in a particular case depends on the sufficiency of
the contacts between the Iranian entity and the United States with respect to the specific activity
in question. See HousE REPORT ON FSIA, supra note 1, at 6612 (the exceptions to the FSIA are
nevertheless governed by the minimum contacts requirement of International Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945)); Chicago Bridge & Iron Co. v. Iran, 506 F. Supp. 981, 985
(N.D. Ill. 1980) (implied consent through treaty does not obviate the need for minimum contacts
with the forum).
It must be noted that this explicit waiver of immunity to jurisdiction is not necessarily
applicable to the issue of immunity from prejudgment attachment. See notes 56-70 and accom-
panying text infra.
42. Iran has repeatedly attempted to escape its treaty commitments. In New England
Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Iran Power Generation & Transmission Co., 502 F. Supp. 120
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does not relieve a state of the obligations undertaken by a previous legitimate
government. 43  Under international law, obligations are made between
states, with governments as their representatives, and it is the state that is
ultimately responsible for those commitments. 44
A second exception to sovereign immunity is set forth in section 1605(a)(2)
of the FSIA. This section provides for federal court jurisdiction over any
commercial activities carried on by a foreign sovereign. 45 For the purposes
of the Act, activities that normally could be engaged in by a private party are
commercial activities, and activities that only a sovereign can perform are
noncommercial. 46  Thus, the nature of the activity rather than the purpose
for which it is performed, determines its status as commercial or governmen-
tal. 47 Since many of the Iranian cases involve activities that are of a com-
mercial nature, this is an important exception to Iran's immunity from
jurisdiction in federal district courts. 41
Act of State Doctrine
Even if Iran could be brought before an American court pursuant to an
exception under the FSIA, the act of state doctrine could have been invoked
(S.D.N.Y. 1980), the court stated "the essence of the [96] claims [here in question] is that the
government of Iran, its agencies and instrumentalities, have expressed an unequivocal intention
of avoiding their just debts." Id. at 122 n.1. Iran's Foreign Minister, Abolhassan Bani Sadr
repudiated all foreign debt as an obligation of the former illegal regime. N.Y. Times, Nov. 23,
1979, at 1, col. 6. Subsequently, however, Iran pledged to pay all its legitimate foreign debts.
Wall St. J., Dec. 3, 1979, at 26, col. 1.
43. BisERLV, supra note 3, at 145. There is no real question that the present government in
Iran is responsible for the obligations of the State of Iran. The executive branch of the United
States Government recognized the new Iranian Government and that recognition is binding on
American courts. Recognition of a government bestows legitimacy on that government, and a
concomitant responsibility for the obligations undertaken by a former regime. American Bell
Int'l, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 474 F. Supp. 420, 423 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). See KMW Int'l,
Inc. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 606 F.2d 10, 16-17 (2d Cir. 1979) (following United States'
recognition, the new Iranian government has the same contractual rights and duties of the
former). Therefore, in the eyes of American courts, the present Iranian government is legitimate
and responsible for its treaties and contracts.
44. Id. See also 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1)(1976), which prohibits immunity based on any
withdrawal of the waiver which the foreign state may purport to effect .... Id. Thus, the
FSIA also prohibits an unauthorized, unilateral withdrawal of a waiver of immunity.
45. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1)(1976). The famous Tate letter of 1952 expressed the State
Department's policy to deny immunity to states regarding their purely commercial activities. 26
DEP'T STATE BULL. 984-85 (1952). This so-called "restrictive theory" of sovereign immunity
embraced by the State Department has been codified at § 1605 of the FSIA. International Ass'n
of Machinists v. Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, 477 F. Supp. 553, 565 (D.C.
Cal. 1979), aff'd on other grounds, 649 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1981).
46. International Ass'n of Machinists v. Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, 477
F. Supp. 553, 566-67 (D.C. Cal. 1979), aff'd on other grounds, 649 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1981).
47. HOUSE REPORT ON FSIA, supra note 1, at 6615. "A contract by a foreign government to
buy provisions or equipment for its armed forces ... constitutes a commercial activity." Id.
48. Cf. New England Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Iran Power Generation & Transmission Co.,
502 F. Supp. 120, 125 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (the 96 cases consolidated in this decision were based on
commercial activities).
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as a defense to subject matter jurisdiction in United States courts. 4' The act
of state doctrine, a principle of both international and American law, pre-
cludes the substantive adjudication of issues that involve a foreign govern-
ment's discretion within its own country. 50  Accordingly, American courts
could have refused to review the validity of the Iranian actions underlying
the lawsuits against Iran. The courts that have considered this defense,
however, have not permitted it to bar judicial consideration, reasoning that
the Treaty of Amity acted as a waiver of the defense or that the activities
involved were of a commercial nature. 51 Thus, the Iranian government is
liable for its obligations notwithstanding the applicability of the act of state
doctrine.
Prejudgment Attachment of Iranian Property
Many American litigants sought prejudgment attachments of Iranian as-
sets for the purpose of retaining the assets in this country to satisfy potential
judgments. 52  The attachments were also sought to maintain control over
49. See, e.g., National American Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 448 F. Supp. 622,
639-40 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (act of state doctrine precludes issues whereas the sovereign immunity
doctrine raises a jurisdictional bar), af'd, 597 F.2d 314 (2d Cir. 1979). Thus, the two doctrines
are similar but not identical. For a comparative analysis of the two doctrines, see generally
Cooper, Act of State and Sovereign Immunity: A Further Inquiry, 11 Loy. CI. L.J. 193, 194
(1980).
50. In Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250 (1897), the Supreme Court stated that: "[e]very
sovereign state is bound to respect the independence of every other state, and the courts of one
country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another done within its own
territory." Id. at 252.
51. See American Int'l Group, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 493 F. Supp. 522, 525
(D.D.C. 1980) (act of state doctrine inapplicable because there was a relevant treaty waiver
provision and the activity of the defendant was commercial), proceeding stayed on appeal, 657
F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Behring Int'l, Inc. v. Imperial Iranian Air Force, 475 F. Supp. 383,
401 (D.N.J. 1979) (act of state doctrine denied because the activities were commercial in nature).
Both cases relied on the recent Supreme Court consideration of the act of state doctrine in Alfred
Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976). A plurality of Justices in
Dunhill agreed that "an act of state should not be extended to include the repudiation of a purely
commercial obligation owed by a foreign sovereign or by one of its commercial instrumentali-
ties." Id. at 695. Although only four Justices recognized a commercial exception in Dunhill, the
opinion, in conjunction with the inclusion of a commercial exception in the FSIA, has been
broadly interpreted as establishing a commercial exception to the act of state doctrine. See, e.g.,
International Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Organization of Petroleum Exporting Coun-
tries, 649 F.2d 1354, 1360 (9th Cir. 1981) (purely commercial activity may not rise to the level of
an act of state); Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 550 F.2d 68, 79 (2d Cir. 1977) (this case not within the
purely commercial exception). But see Industrial Inv. Dev. v. Mitsui & Co., 594 F.2d 48, 52 n.9
(5th Cir. 1979) (although a majority of the Supreme Court has never recognized a purely
commercial exception, one circuit court did).
52. Prior to the Iran Accords, judicial attachments of Iran's assets in the United States
totalled about two billion dollars. IALR, supra note 26, at 2,085.
Attachment is the act of seizing or blocking persons or property by judicial order to bring
them or it under the control of the court. A prejudgment attachment is one which is issued before
judgment for the purpose of securing the assets of the defendants in preparation for execution of
judgment. Reading & Bates Corp. v. National Iranian Oil Co., 478 F. Supp. 724, 726 (S.D.N.Y.
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Iranian property in the event the presidential freeze was revoked and at-
tempts were made to return the assets to Iran.
To have a prejudgment writ of attachment, one must generally show that
there is a reasonable likelihood of eventual success on the merits of the case
and that there are grounds for insecurity concerning the property sought to
be attached.53 Prejudgment attachment is a rare and harsh remedy since it
can deny the defendant possession of his property pending final disposition of
the controversy. 54 For this reason, the FSIA treats the waiver of immunity
from prejudgment attachment differently than waiver of immunity from
other types of judicial processes. 55
While an implicit waiver is sufficient to gain jurisdiction over a foreign
sovereign, 5 section 1610(d) of the FSIA states that a foreign country, even if
engaged in activities of a commercial nature, shall be subject to prejudgment
attachment only if it has explicitly waived immunity. 57  Nevertheless, in
Behring International v. Imperial Iranian Air Force,5 the District Court of
New Jersey held that the explicit waiver requirements of FSIA section
1610(d) were superseded by an implicit waiver of immunity from prejudg-
ment attachment found in the Treaty of Amity. 5 The Behring court rea-
soned that international agreements are superior to the FSIA and should be
governed by ordinary principles of statutory construction, not by reference to
the FSIA. 6' The Treaty of Amity was intended to set Iranian entities doing
business with United States companies on equal footing with American
litigants in United States courts. 6 ' Thus, "equal footing" necessarily includes
finding Iranian entities subject to prejudgment attachment. 2
Other courts, however, have been reluctant to issue writs of prejudgment
attachment because of the special treatment given such writs under the FSIA
1979). Requirements necessary for obtaining prejudgment attachment are dependent upon the
state law in which the district court is located. FED. R. Civ. P. 64.
53. Because most of the Iran cases were filed in New York, New York law controlled on the
requirements for many attachments. See N.Y. Civ. PrAc. LAW §§ 6201, 6223(b) (McKinney
1980). See also New England Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Iran Power Generation & Transmission
Co., 502 F. Supp. 120, 132 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (attachments should be confirmed given a demon-
stration of success on the merits since insecurity stemmed from Iran's attempt to withdraw its
funds and the New York statute authorized attachments in these cases).
54. New England Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Iran Generation & Transmission Co., 502 F.
Supp. 120, 126-27 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
55. Id. at 126. See Reading & Bates Corp. v. National Iranian Oil Co., 478 F. Supp. 724,
728 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (Congress recognized that prejudgment attachments are potentially more
harassing, and therefore, require an explicit waiver).
56. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1) (1976). See notes 40-41 and accompanying text supra.
57. 28 U.S.C. § 1610(d)(1) (1976). In addition, the purpose for which the party seeks
attachment must be to secure a judgment. Id. § 1610(2).
58. 475 F. Supp. 383 (D.N.J. 1979).
59. Id. at 385-87, 395-96. While the Treaty of Amity contained an explicit waiver of
immunity to jurisdiction, see note 41 and accompanying text supra, the waiver of immunity to
prejudgment attachment was found implicitly by the Behring court.
60. Id. at 394-95.
61. Id. at 395.
62. Id.
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and the special nature of the attachment remedy. In E-Systems, Inc. v.
Islamic Republic of Iran,63 for example, an American manufacturer sought
to attach Iranian assets in the United States as security in its suit to recover on
the conversion of its property and to receive payment for services performed
on a contract. The E-Systems court found that at the time the Treaty was
signed, it was standard practice not to subject foreign governments to attach-
ments. 64  Moreover, the court reasoned that Congress intended the FSIA
control matters on which a treaty is silent.6 5 Thus, the court held that
although there was a waiver of jurisdiction in the Treaty of Amity, it was not
explicit and, therefore, insufficient to waive immunity from prejudgment
attachment under the FSIA.6 6  In essence, the court viewed the FSIA as a
mechanism for interpreting treaties rather than as a substantive statute that
would be subordinate to a treaty.6 7
The rationale employed by the Behring court supported a more equitable
result than E-Systems with respect to the conflict between the Treaty of
Amity and the FSIA. To allow Iran immunity from prejudgment attachment
would give it an unfair advantage over American companies and would
defeat the intention of the Treaty. 8 It is a general rule of law that treaties
should be liberally construed to effectuate the apparent intention of the
parties.69  The Behring court correctly viewed the FSIA as substantive legis-
lation to which a treaty is superior,7 0 rather than as a rigid mechanism for
treaty interpretation. Under the Treaty of Amity, therefore, the prejudg-
ment attachments of Iranian assets constituted a valid security measure by
American claimants.
63. 491 F. Supp. 1294 (N.D. Tex. 1980).
64. Id. at 1300.
65. "To the extent such international agreements are silent on a question of immunity, the
bill would control; the international agreement would control only where a conflict was mani-
fest." HouSE REPORT ON FSIA, supra note 1, at 6616. The Treaty, however, does not explicitly
mention attachment. It provides that "[n]o enterprise of either [Iran or the United States] ... if
it engages in commercial . . .or other business activities . . . [shall claim] . . .immunity ...
from taxation, suit, execution or judgment or other liability to which privately owned and
controlled enterprises are subject therein." Treaty of Amity, supra note 25, art. XI, para. 4, 8
U.S.T. at 909 (emphasis added).
66. 491 F. Supp. at 1300. See also Reading & Bates Corp. v. National Iranian Oil Co., 478
F. Supp. 724, 728 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (though strict rules of construction do not require that the
FSIA be binding on the Treaty, policy requires that the waiver of prejudgment attachment be
explicit).
67. Id. at 1304. But see C. ANTIEAU, MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 574 (1969) (treaties are
subordinate to later acts of Congress).
68. The court in Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord articulated the Treaty's intent by stating that the Treaty
of Amity guarantees Iran access to United States courts on the "same terms available to United
States Nationals .... 522 F.2d 612, 619 n.9 (8th Cir. 1975).
69. See Jordan v. Tashiro, 278 U.S. 123, 127 (1928) (treaties must be liberally construed to
effectuate the intention of the parties); Tucker v. Alexandroff, 183 U.S. 424, 437 (1902) (treaties
should be interpreted in a broad and liberal fashion).
70. 475 F. Supp. at 393. See also 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (1976) (FSIA is subordinate to existing
international agreements). Even without this statutory provision, however, it has been widely
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EXECUTIVE INTERVENTION IN THE IRAN CASES
The efforts of plaintiffs seeking redress against Iran in American courts
were impeded by two separate presidential initiatives. First, President
Carter implemented the freeze which prevented Iran from withdrawing its
assets from the United States. 7' Second, more than a year later, the Presi-
dent signed the Iran Accords. 72 The effect of this agreement on private
litigation was twofold. It suspended judicial findings of jurisdiction over Iran
and cancelled prejudgment attachments of Iranian property. 72
These actions by President Carter raise the issue of whether the executive is
authorized by Congress and the Constitution to intervene in disputes be-
tween American nationals and foreign governments or whether the resolu-
tion of such disputes lies more appropriately within the province of the
judiciary. Thus, the broad scope of the President's authority to direct foreign
affairs must be examined in light of the judiciary's authority pursuant to the
FSIA. Such an examination reveals that the implementation of the freeze was
justified under the President's power, pursuant to the IEEPA, to issue sanc-
tions in times of national emergencies. The President's perceived authority to
alter the adjudicatory rights of American creditors, however, infringed upon
the judiciary's power under the FSIA to hear these disputes.
International Emergencies Economic Powers Act
The authority for both the freezing of assets and Iran Accords was princi-
pally derived from the International Emergencies Economic Powers Act. 73
held that treaties are superior to statutes. For cases articulating this premise see Missouri v.
Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920), and Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258 (1890).
71. Exec. Order No. 12170, 3 C.F.R. 457 (1981), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (Supp. III
1979). The order provides in pertinent part: "I, Jimmy Carter ... hereby order blocked all
property and interests in property of the government of Iran, its instrumentalities and controlled
entities and the Central Bank of Iran which are or become subject to the jurisdiction of the
United States. ... Id.
72. The Iran Accords were embodied in the following four documents: Declaration of the
Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria, January 19, 1981, DEI'T STATE
BULL., Feb., 1981, at 1; Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular
Republic of Algeria Concerning the Settlement of Claims by Iran and the United States, January
19, 1981, DEP'T STATE BULL., Feb., 1981, at 3; Undertakings of the Government of the United
States of America and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran with Respect to the
Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria, January 19,
1981, DEP'T STATE BULL., Feb., 1981, at 4; Escrow Agreement, January 19, 1981, DEP'T STATE
BULL., Feb., 1981 at 6 [hereinafter collectively cited as Iran Accords]. For additional informa-
tion on the Accords and the details of their implementation, see Statement of Adherence by the
United States, January 19, 1981, DEP'T STATE BULL., Feb., 1981, at 7; Technical Arrangement
Between Banque Centrale D'Algerie As Escrow Agent and the Governor and Company of the
Bank of England and the Federal Reserve Bank of New York As Fiscal Agent of the United
States, January 19, 1981, DEP'T STATE BULL., Feb., 1981, at 14; Exec. Orders 12276-12285, 46
Fed. Reg. 7911-7932 (1981).
73. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706 (Supp. III 1979). President Carter relied on both the IEEPA and
the executive powers under the Constitution in implementing the Iran Accords. Message to the
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The IEEPA was modeled after the Trading With the Enemy Act (TWEA),74
which has been used by Presidents throughout this century to block the assets
of enemies during wartime or to deal with other national emergencies. 75
Scrutiny of the provisions in the IEEPA, in light of its predecessor the
TWEA, yields some understanding of the President's scope of authority in
this field.
Section 5(b) of the TWEA is the forerunner of that portion of the IEEPA
which permitted the blocking of Iran's assets. Under the original 1917 Act,
section 5(b) only could be invoked to deal with alien property in wartime. 71
President Franklin D. Roosevelt, however, used it to declare a banking
holiday when the country went off the gold standard, and Congress swiftly
amended the section to allow similar actions by the President to deal with
peacetime emergencies. 77 The TWEA has more recently been used to freeze
Cuban and North Korean assets after communist takeovers in those coun-
tries. 7
The constitutionality of the TWEA has been frequently challenged. 79 In
United States v. Chemical Foundation,80 a group of American creditors
brought suit against the federal government challenging the disposition of
German property confiscated during World War II. The Alien Property
Custodian,8' appointed by the President, secured the assets of German na-
tionals located in the United States. The Supreme Court held that the Alien
Property Custodian had absolute dominion over all the property and could
Congress, 17 WEEKLY COMP. OF PREs. Doc. 3041, 3044 (Jan. 19, 1981) [hereinafter cited as
Message to the Congress].
74. 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-40 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
75. See generally M. DoMKE, TRADING WITH THE ENEMY IN WORLD WAR II (1943); J.
GATHINGS, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND AMERICAN TREATMENT OF ALIEN ENEMY PROPERTY (1940).
For a history of the use of the TWEA and the purpose of recent changes, see HOUSE COMM. ON
INT'L RELATIONS, TRADING WITH THE ENEMY Acr REFORM LEGISLATION, H.R. REP. No. 459, 95TH
CONG., lST SEss. 2 (1977) [hereinafter cited as HouSE REPORT ON IEEPA], and Note, Presidential
Emergency Powers Related to International Economic Transactions: Congressional Recognition
of Customary Authority, 11 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 515 (1978) [hereinafter cited as President's
Emergency Powers]. For a history of related statutes before the TWEA, see C. HUBERIcH, THE
LAW RELATING TO TRADING WITH THE ENEMY (1918).
76. HOUSE REPORT ON IEEPA, supra note 75, at 4.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 5-6.
79. See, e.g., Propper v. Clark, 337 U.S. 472, 484 (1949) (as federal legislation founded on
Constitutional provisions, the TWEA properly enabled the President to appoint a custodian to
take possession of Austrian property); Sardino v. Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 361 F.2d
106, 111-12 (2d Cir.) (the freezing of Cuban assets pursuant to the TWEA was a constitutional
means of protecting United States citizens and the national interest), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 898
(1966); Ecker v. Atlantic Refining Co., 222 F.2d 298, 299 (4th Cir. 1955) (TWEA not unconsti-
tutional violation of due process requirements); United States v.Leiner, 143 F.2d 298, 299 (2d
Cir. 1944) (TWEA is not unconstitutional due to vagueness).
80. 272 U.S. 1 (1926).
81. The President is authorized to appoint such a custodian in order to hold enemy property
until an order of payment is made by the President or a federal court. 50 U.S.C. app. § 6 (1976).
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dispose of it as he chose. 82 The Court also held that the TWEA was to be
liberally construed to allow the President sufficient authority to lead the
country in its war effort. 83
Furthermore, the constitutionality of regulations issued under the TWEA
have also been challenged. For example, in Sardino v. Federal Reserve Bank
of New York,84 the validity of the Cuban Assets Control Regulations, the
model for the Iranian Assets Control Regulations, was tested. The Second
Circuit in Sardino held that the TWEA was not an unconstitutional delega-
tion of power to the executive and that the regulations were a proper use of
this Act.8 5 The court also stated that the judiciary could not review a
declaration of emergency by the President, as it is "peculiarly within the
province of the Chief Executive" to determine when such action is neces-
sary. 8  Thus, Sardino and Chemical Foundation are examples of the ex-
treme deference with which the courts have viewed executive actions based
on the TWEA.17  Consequently, American creditors of alien property have
been obliged, during periods of emergencies, to bow to the foreign affairs
prerogatives of the President.
There are two major differences between the IEEPA and the TWEA
which reflect a congressional intention to curtail the unbridled power of the
President under the older statute.88 Similar to the TWEA, the IEEPA allows
the President to block the transfer of enemy property. 89 Unlike the TWEA,
however, it does not permit the President to vest legal title to the property in
the federal government.10 Under the TWEA, the courts held that the execu-
tive had absolute dominion over the confiscated property and could deter-
mine its disposition. 9' In contrast, the IEEPA prohibits confiscation of
82. 272 U.S. at 12-13.
83. Id. at 10.
84. 361 F.2d 106 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 898 (1966).
85. 361 F.2d at 110.
86. Id. at 109.
87. See also Propper v. Clark, 337 U.S. 472 (1949). The Court stated that the President's
power pursuant to the TWEA "in peace and in war must be given generous scope to accomplish
its purpose." Id. at 481.
88. President's Emergency Powers, supra note 75, at 515. The IEEPA revised the TWEA
"providing somewhat narrower powers subject to congressional review in times of 'national
emergency' short of war." HOUSE REPoRT ON IEEPA, supra note 75, at 1.
89. 50 U.S.C. § 1702 (Supp. III 1979).
90. HouSE REPORT ON IEEPA, supra note 75, at 15; S. REP. No. 466, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 5,
reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4540, 4543 (authority to vest property is not
granted to the President through the IEEPA).
91. See United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 229 (1942) (the authority of the President to
settle claims of our nationals with a foreign government is a modest implied power); United
States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 330 (1937) (the President may provide for settlement of claims
with a foreign government without an actual treaty in effect); United States v. Schooner Peggy,
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 102, 110 (1801) (courts cannot settle the right of an American litigant contrary
to a claim provision in a treaty); Ozanic v. United States, 188 F.2d 228, 231 (2d Cir. 1951) (the
power of the President "extends to the settlement of mutual claims between a foreign govern-
ment and the United States, at least when it is incident to the recognition of that government").
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assets, 92 thereby considerably weakening the executive branch's authority to
dispose of the property by its own plan.
A second important difference is that the IEEPA established guidelines by
which a President may declare a national emergency.9 3 As previously noted,
the TWEA set no limits on the President's authority to declare a national
emergency. Section 1701 of the IEEPA, however, provides that the executive
authority under the Act may be used only to deal with an extraordinary
threat to the security, foreign policy, or economy of this country that origi-
nates substantially outside the United States. 4 The President is also re-
quired to follow the procedures established in the National Emergencies Act
(NEA) to declare a national emergency.9 5 Thus, although Congress retained
much of the same language in the new statute, the changes made were
intended to curtail the President's domestic use of the IEEPA during peace-
time periods. 6
The "Freeze" and Its Affect on the Litigation
On November 14, 1979, President Carter issued an Executive Order that
declared a national emergency and blocked the transfer of Iranian assets,
including funds in United States banks and their branches in foreign coun-
tries. 7 The freeze lasted for over a year and ultimately was used to negoti-
ate for the return of fifty-two American embassy personnel held hostage in
Iran. 8 The Executive Order freezing the Iranian property was based on the
IEEPA and authorized the implementation of Iranian Assets Control Regula-
tions (IACR).99 These regulations were administered by the Office of For-
eign Assets Control of the Department of the Treasury, and were similar in
form to the rules that governed the freezing of Cuban property after Fidel
Castro's takeover. 00 The IACR described and implemented the freeze in
detail, and provided for licensed transfers of Iranian property only in limited
situations.' 0' Section 504 of the regulations authorized judicial proceedings
relating to property in which Iran had an interest, but prohibited both the
entry of final judgments in Iranian related litigation and the payment of
92. 50 U.S.C. § 1702 (Supp. III 1979).
93. Id. § 1701.
94. Id.
95. Id. §§ 1601-1651, 1706.
96. HousE REPORT ON IEEPA, supra note 75, at 10-11.
97. Exec. Order No. 12170, 3 C.F.R. 457 (1981), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (Supp. III
1979). For the text of the order, see note 71 supra..
98. See Message to the Congress, supra note 73, at 3044.
99. 31 C.F.R. §§ 535.101-904 (1980).
100. Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. §§ 515.101-809 (1981). In the past,
similar regulations have also been issued with regard to property of other nations. E.g., Foreign
Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. §§ 500.101-809 (1981).
101. 31 C.F.R. §§ 535.502-578 (1980) (an example of a special circumstance is the remittance
of under $1000 per month to a close relative in Iran by a United States citizen from other than a
blocked account pursuant to § 535.563).
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funds from blocked Iranian accounts.10 2  During the freeze, the regulations
were one part of the executive's attempt to prevent the courts from interfer-
ing with the President's handling of the Iran crisis.
The Justice Department filed Statements of Interest in many of the Iran
cases supporting the executive's request for a stay of judicial proceedings. 0 3
The executive branch did not want the courts to reach final decisions in the
cases that would restrict the United States government's flexibility in negoti-
ating for the release of the hostages. 0 4  Of those courts that addressed the
executive's request for stays, most granted temporary rather than indefinite
stays.'0 5 In National Airmotive Corp. v. Government of Iran,' for exam-
ple, the District Court for the District of Columbia balanced the rights of the
plaintiff to its "day in court" against the foreign affairs prerogative of the
President, and granted a temporary stay for seventy days. 0 7 Denying the
State Department's request for an unlimited stay, the court wrote: "An
immobilization of the judicial system through the grant of an indefinite stay
under these circumstances would simply add the American system of law and
justice to the hostage rolls."10
In New England Merchants National Bank v. Iran,109 the effect of the
President's involvement in the Iranian situation was contrary to the result
intended. In New England Merchants, ninety-six cases brought by American
plaintiffs against Iran were consolidated for the sole purpose of determining
whether prejudgment attachment of Iranian assets was appropriate. 0  The
federal district judge reasoned that since the President thought it necessary to
indiscriminately freeze all of Iran's assets by Executive Order, a judicial
attachment, tantamount to a judicial "freeze," was justifiable as there were
specific and legitimate claims against the subject property."' The State
Department requested that the attachments not be allowed, but the judge
102. Id. § 535.504 (1980). See also id. § 535.418 (prejudgment attachment is allowed, but not
payment from a blocked account).
103. See, e.g., New England Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Iran Power Generation & Transmission
Co., 502 F. Supp. 120, 133 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (the government requested an indefinite stay in all
96 cases); National Airmotive Corp. v. Government of Iran, 499 F. Supp. 401, 403 n.1 (D.D.C.
1980) (court took judicial notice that similar Suggestions of Interest had been filed in suits against
Iran throughout the country).
104. McGreevy, The Iranian Crisis and U.S. Law, 2 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 384, 416-19
(1980) (the United States foreign policy would be damaged by decisions in the cases pending
against Iran) (citing Letter of Robert B. Owens, Legal Adviser, Department of State, to Attorney
General Benjamin R. Civiletti (Jan. 4, 1980)).
105. For a discussion of judicial dispositions on the executive's request for stays, see generally
IALR, supra note 26, at 1618 (Oct. 17, 1980), 2087 (Jan. 2, 1981).
106. 499 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1980).
107. Id. at 405-07.
108. Id. at 406 n.1l.
109. 502 F. Supp. 120 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
110. Id. at 121-22.
111. Id. Judge Duffy stated that, "if Iran's threat was serious enough to trigger the blocking of
all Iranian assets in this country without reference to any specific debt, then certainly when the
specific debts are enunciated, individual orders of attachment are warranted." Id. at 133.
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pointed out that prejudgment attachments were licensed by the IACR." 2
Since the basis for the attachments was the executive freeze, the question of
whether an unblocking of the assets by the President would also suspend the
judicial "freeze" was left undecided. 113
President Carter's "freezing" of the Iranian assets was a valid use of the
IEEPA. Previously, the courts held that identical language in the TWEA
could sustain similar interferences with foreign property by the President." 4
The changes in the new law do not affect that prerogative." 5 Secondly, the
blocking cannot be challenged on the ground that the national emergency
did not exist, "' because courts traditionally have not reviewed the legitimacy
of national emergencies as declared by the President." 7 Finally, the freeze
was compatible with the intentions of Congress as expressed by the enact-
ment of the IEEPA because the President followed the procedures established
by the NEA for the declaration and continuation of a national emergency," 8
and the foreign property was merely blocked, thus legal title thereto was not
vested in the federal government. Therefore, the blocking of Iran's property
is sustained by precedent and is not contrary to the expressed will of Con-
gress.
THE IRAN AccoRDs
On his last day in office, President Carter implemented the Iran Accords,
which provided for the release of the American hostages and the unblocking
112. Id. at 130. See IACR, 31 C.F.R. § 535.504(b)(1) (1980).
113. Just before the freeze was lifted, on December 22, 1980, Judge Duffy delivered a
certification of issues opinion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (Supp. IV 1980). In New England
Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Iran, 508 F. Supp. 49 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), the parties requested the court
to determine whether the attachments would be affected by the President's lifting of the freeze.
At that time Justice Duffy stated, "Such a contingency is simply not a 'case or controversy'
properly before any court at the present time... I will not certify it to the Court of Appeals." Id.
at 51. On appeal, the Second Circuit remanded the case to allow the district court to consider the
effect of the Iran Accords. New England Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Iran, 646 F.2d 779 (2d Cir.
1981). In compliance with the court of appeals, Justice Duffy chose one of the 96 consolidated
cases, Marschalk Co. v. Iran National Airlines Corp., 518 F. Supp. 69 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd and
remanded, 657 F.2d 3 (2d Cir. 1981), and issued an opinion only weeks before a contrary
opinion was rendered by the Supreme Court in Dames & Moore v. Regan, 101 S. Ct. 2972
(1981). See notes 134-37 and accompanying text infra.
114. The nearly identical Cuban Assets Control Regulations were found to be a valid use of
the TWEA in Real v. Simon, 510 F.2d 557, 560 (5th Cir. 1975) and Sardino v. Federal Reserve
Bank of New York, 361 F.2d 106, 109 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 898 (1966).
115. The section of the IEEPA authorizing presidential action is identical to the earlier
TWEA provision. See 50 U.S.C. § 1702 (Supp. III 1979).
116. IEEPA requires that the President declare a national emergency before blocking the free
flow of assets. See notes 93-94 and accompanying text supra.
117. See, e.g., Sardino v. Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 361 F.2d 106, 109 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 898 (1966) (courts will not review a declaration of national emergency
because such an act is so peculiarly within the scope of presidential authority).
118. National Emergencies Act of 1976, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1651 (Supp. III 1979).
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of Iranian assets." 9 To unblock the assets, the agreements and the accompa-
nying Executive Orders stayed all judicial proceedings and nullified all judi-
cial attachments. 20 The Accords established an International Tribunal to
hear claims by American nationals against Iran, displacing the jurisdiction of
federal district courts under the FSIA.' 2 1
The indefinite stay of all legal proceedings in United States courts brought
about by the Iran Accords is difficult to sustain because it infringes on the
power of the judiciary under the FSIA to hear these disputes. 22 Addition-
ally, the nullification of judicial attachments constituted a taking of private
property, in violation of the United States Constitution,2 3 and may have
exceeded the President's authority. The President's broad foreign affairs
powers and his authority to consummate this type of agreement will be
analyzed to determine whether the Iran Accords represent a legitimate use of
those powers.124 More specifically, the FSIA and IEEPA must be contrasted
insofar as they affect the powers of the executive branch. Finally, the alleged
national interest, as perceived by the executive must be weighed against the
individual liberties of American plaintiffs.
The President's Foreign Affairs Powers
The resolution of foreign policy issues frequently prohibits judicial activ-
ity. In the field of foreign affairs, the government must be able to speak with
119. See notes 72-73 supra..
120. "All rights, powers and privileges relating to the properties [of Iran] are nullified ......
Exec. Order No. 12277, 46 Fed. Reg. 7915 (1981).
121. Iran Accords, supra note 72, DEP'T STATE BULL., Jan. 1981, at 3. Article II, para. 1,
provides: "[a]n International Arbitral Tribunal (the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal) is
hereby established .. " Id. Cf. Exec. Order No. 12294, 46 Fed. Reg. 14, 111 (1981) (if the
Tribunal determines that it does not have jurisdiction, the suspension of the claims would be
lifted).
There were advocates for a repudiation of the Accords. See, e.g., Wall St. J., Jan. 21, 1981, at
26, col. 1. (editorial). And, not surprisingly, American creditors were openly skeptical of the
integrity of Iran. Nat'l L.J., March 2, 1981, at 8, col 2.
122. This represents a more serious deprivation of individual rights, as compared to the
freezing of assets since the delay of proceedings is indefinite. The American courts had assumed
jurisdiction over the cases and some judicial attachments were granted. The agreement with Iran
also makes concessions or promises regarding America's foreign policy toward Iran, nationaliza-
tion of the late Shah Mohammed Reza Phalavi's assets, and the rights of the Americans who were
held as hostages in the United States embassy in Tehran. These issues, however, are beyond the
scope of this Comment. See, The Iranian Hostage Agreement Under International and United
States Law, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 822 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Hostage Agreement]; Sympo-
sium on the Settlement with Iran, 13 LAW. AM. at i (1981) [hereinafter cited as Iran Sympo-
sium].
123. "[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S.
CONST. amend. V.
124. The President relied on those powers as justification for his action. Message to the
Congress, supra note 73, at 3044.
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a single voice. 2 5  Thus, the courts are generally willing to defer to the
actions of the executive in matters involving his foreign affairs prerogative. 12
One of the most compelling justifications for intervention in the Iran cases,
the President's executive agreement authority, arises out of his foreign affairs
powers. The authority of the President to bind the nation in international
agreements is broad in scope. 12 7  In contemporary times, executive agree-
ments are used to perform virtually any function that could be performed by
a treaty 28 and the treaty making power extends to all matters not specifically
prohibited by the Constitution.2 9 Nevertheless, some executive agreements
that have directly contravened federal law have been struck down by the
courts. 3 0  If the courts find that the Iran Accords directly defeated the
explicit intention of Congress, as manifested in the grant of jurisdiction to the
courts in the FSIA or as manifested by the new restrictions in the IEEPA, the
executive agreement need not be sustained. Thus, it is more telling to exam-
ine the statutes, case law, and policies that support or oppose the President's
claim to nullify attachments and cancel jurisdiction rather than merely
deferring to the broad foreign affairs power of the President.
The validity of the Iran Accords has been challenged in various federal
courts. 13  In Marschalk Co. v. Iran National Airlines Corp.,'132 a federal
125. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936). In Chicago
& Southern Airlines, Inc. v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 333 U.S. 103 (1948), the Supreme
Court stated that courts should refuse to become involved in executive decisions regarding
foreign policy "of a kind for which the judiciary has neither the aptitude, facilities, nor responsi-
bility .. ." Id. at 111.
126. See, e.g., United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319-22 (1936)
(President has broad authority to conduct foreign affairs).
Under the political question doctrine, a principle separate and distinct from the President's
foreign affairs powers, the courts will not become involved in cases that require the adjudication
of political issues. One commentator has noted that the Iran cases were truly commercial claims
and thus the courts properly had authority to hear them. The Supreme Court, 1980 Term, 95
HARV. L. REV. 191, 196 (1981). Even if these cases could be deemed political because of the
President's involvement, the Court in Baker v. Carr stated "it is error to suppose that every case
or controversy which touches foreign relations lies beyond judicial cognizance." 369 U.S. 186,
217 (1962). Moreover, these are the very type of claims that Congress intended the courts to
adjudicate when it enacted the exceptions to the FSIA.
127. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319-22 (1936). On the
extent of executive agreement power and treaty making power of the President, see generally, G.
SCHUBERT, THE PRESIDENCY IN THE COURTS 102-18 (1957).
128. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 230 (1942) (executive agreements are to be afforded
a dignity similar to that given treaties).
129. See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
130. See, e.g., United States v. Guy W. Capps, Inc., 204 F.2d 655 (4th Cir. 1953), afJ'd on
other grounds, 348 U.S. 296 (1955) (an executive agreement that was in clear opposition to a
congressional statute was unconstitutional); Seery v. United States, 127 F. Supp. 601 (Ct. Cl.
1955) (an executive agreement cannot nullify Congress's waiver of the government's immunity to
suit).
131. See, e.g., American Int'l Group, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 657 F.2d 430 (D.C.
Cir. 1981); Charles T. Main Int'l, Inc. v. Khuzestan Water Power Auth., 651 F.2d (1st Cir.
1981); Security Pac. Nat'l Bank v. Iran, 513 F. Supp. 864 (C.D. Cal. 1981); Unidyne Corp. v.
Government of Iran, 512 F. Supp. 705 (E.D. Va. 1981).
132. 518 F. Supp. 69 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 657 F.2d 3 (2d Cir. 1981).
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district court in New York held that the President exceeded his authority both
in nullifying the judicial attachments and cancelling the jurisdiction of
American courts over those claims.'3 3 Although the well-reasoned Mars-
chalk opinion was firmly based on the pertinent statutes and case law, it has
been effectively reversed by the Supreme Court's ultimate disposition of the
issue in Dames & Moore v. Regan. 134
The Court in Dames & Moore upheld the Accords finding that the Presi-
dent was authorized to nullify the judicial attachments of Iranian property
under the IEEPA and to suspend the claims of American citizens under his
foreign affairs powers.'3 5 In an admittedly rushed opinion, Justice Rhen-
quist attempted to base the holding "on the narrowest possible grounds
capable of deciding the case."'M6  The Court relied heavily on the deference
which Congress and the Court have traditionally given Presidents when
dealing with foreign nations.' 37
The President's Nullification of Judicial Attachments
As a basis for upholding the President's nullification of prejudgment at-
tachments, the Dames & Moore Court relied on Orvis v. Brownell.'3 8  In
Orvis, an American claimant with an attachment against the property of a
Japanese national brought suit against the Enemy Alien Property Custodian
to enforce his judgment. 13 9 After careful analysis of Orvis, however, the
glaring differences between it and the present controversy become appar-
ent.' 40 In Orvis, the suit by American creditors was against enemy property
possessed by the United States Government,14 ' whereas in Dames & Moore
the attachment was against property owned by Iran but not in possession of
the federal government.' 4' The Orvis Court did not allow attachments to
affect the government's disposition of enemy property, but explicitly found
the attachments to be enforceable against the enemy debtor.14 3 This neces-
sarily implies that neither the enemy debtor, nor the United States Govern-
ment acting as its agent, could disregard those attachments by removing the
assets from the country. Since that is precisely what the Iran Accords did,
Justice Rehnquist's reliance on Orvis is less than persuasive. The Orvis Court
133. Id. at 78-81.
134. 101 S. Ct. 2972 (1981).
135. Id. at 2984, 2986.
136. Id. at 2981. The Court was rushed into a decision by the government's deadline of July
19, 1981 for the transfer of the final $2.2 billion of Iran's assets. Id.
137. Id. at 2984-90.
138. 345 U.S. 183 (1953).
139. Id. at 184-85.
140. It is noteworthy that these differences were recognized by Judge Duffy in Marschalk.
Marschalk, 518 F. Supp. at 96-97.
141. 345 U.S. at 185.
142. 101 S. Ct. at 2983 n.5.
143. 345 U.S. at 185.
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distinguished two previous cases; one in which the property had vested in the
government, and one in which it had merely been subject to an executive
freeze. 144 When the property vested, the Court held that the government
agent was entitled to possession, 45 but in the other instance, the attachment
was not within the authority of the government to extinguish. 14  This
distinction is particularly important because the government, in accordance
with IEEPA, is no longer allowed to vest or take title to the property. 147
In Dames & Moore, the section of the IEEPA that allows the President to
"nullify any property in which any foreign country has in interest"'' 48 was
examined to determine whether it authorized the nullification of prejudg-
ment attachments of Iranian property.149 Justice Rehnquist rightly asserted
that the plain language of the statute is broad, and if taken literally, supports
the government's position. 50 On previous occasions, however, the Supreme
Court has reasoned that the IEEPA's predecessor, the TWEA, was patch-
work legislation which should not be applied literally. 151 Surely, the pur-
pose of the TWEA "to define, regulate, and punish trading with the en-
emy"1'2 is inapposite to the government's deliverance of judicially attached
property to Iran. Moreover, the IEEPA restricts the President's authority in
peacetime by forbidding the manipulation of purely domestic transactions
and the taking of title to foreign property. 153 The statute's enactment was
not a vain exercise by Congress, rather the statute was intended to be a
limitation on the President's power.15 4
The Iran Accords may also have exceeded the President's authority on
constitutional grounds. The judicial attachments of Iranian assets were prop-
erty rights of the American creditors that could not be taken without due
process of law. 55 The President's nullification of those attachments consti-
tutes a taking requiring that adequate compensation be given to the deprived
144. Id. at 186. See Zitman v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 446 (1951); Zitman v. McGrath, 341 U.S.
471 (1951).
145. Zitman v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 471, 474 (1951).
146. See Zitman v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 446, 463-64 (1951) (the custodian steps into the shoes
of the enemy and only his vesting power would allow the distribution of enemy's assets).
147. See notes 90-92 and accompanying text supra.
148. 50 U.S.C. § 1702 (Supp. III 1979).
149. 101 S. Ct. at 2982-84.
150. Id. at 2983-84.
151. Guessefeldt v. McGrath, 342 U.S. 308, 319 (1952) (such legislation weighs against a
literal application). See also Clark v. Uebersee Finanz-Korp, 332 U.S. 480 (1947); Silesian-
American Corp. v. Clark, 332 U.S. 469 (1947); Markham v. Cabell, 326 U.S. 404 (1945).
152. H.R. 4960, 65th Cong., 1st Sess. (1917).
153. HousE REPORT ON IEEPA, supra note 75, at 15.
154. See notes 88-96 and accompanying text supra.
155. Dames & Moore, 101 S. Ct. at 2992-93 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). Justice Powell stated that an attachment "is a property right compensable under the Fifth
Amendment .. "" Id. at 2992 n.1 (citing Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40 (1960);
Louisville Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555 (1935)). See also New England Merchants Nat'l Bank
v. Iran, 508 F. Supp. 49, 51 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (the attachments were property rights, the
tancellation of which required due process of law).
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parties. 156 Thus, American creditors that are legitimately dissatisfied with
the determination of their case by the International Tribunal have an action
against the federal government for satisfaction of those claims. 5 7  In the
event Iran does not fulfill its obligations under the Accords, the United States
Government could become liable for the billions of dollars of claims against
Iran. 158
Finally, the President's power to void judicial attachments against foreign
property must be weighed against the rights of individual American creditors
to secure their claims against foreign governments. The President's ability to
provide for the settlement of claims is inextricably tied to this balancing. If
the President truly has the authority to provide for the settlement of Ameri-
can claims against Iran, 1 59 providing for the transfer of those funds abroad
through the nullification of judicial attachment is, arguably, a concomitant
authority. In any event, the attachments of Iranian assets must, at the very
least, mitigate against the President's power to settle claims so encumbered.
Cancellation of jurisdiction Over the American Claims
In upholding President Carter's cancellation of claims in United States
courts, the Dames & Moore Court relied on the discretionary foreign affairs
power of the Presidency, the President's claim settlement authority, the
IEEPA, and the Hostage Act of 1868.160 The Court's reasoning, however,
failed to recognize relevant congressional direction as well as the distinctions
between the Iran settlement and previous foreign claim settlements. As a
result, the Court promulgated an expansive precedent for the exercise of
presidential prerogatives.
The most persuasive argument for upholding the cancellation of claims is
the President's claim settlement authority.'6 ' Justice Rehnquist, in Dames &
156. U.S. CONST. amend. V. But see Hostage Agreement, supra note 122, at 874-76 (arguing
that the President's action was not a taking).
157. Cf. Dames & Moore, 101 S. Ct. at 2991 (the question of whether there had been a taking
was not ripe for review, but the Court of Claims would later have jurisdiction under the Tucker
Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1976), to make that determination).
158. See Dames & Moore, 101 S. Ct. at 2993 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). According to Justice Powell, "[t]he government must pay just compensation when it
furthers the Nation's foreign policy goals by using as 'bargaining chips' claims lawfully held by a
relatively few persons and subject to the jurisdiction of our courts." Id.
159. An apt analogy can be drawn between the President's initiatives in the Iran cases and
President Truman's seizing of the steel mills during the Korean conflict. In both cases the
President attempted to manipulate domestic property rights because of foreign policy implica-
tions. The Supreme Court overturned Truman's decision, but failed to do so with Carter's
agreement. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 589 (1952).
160. The Iran Accords, as signed by Assistant Secretary of State Warren B. Christopher,
called for a cancellation of claims. See note 72 supra. President Reagan's implementing executive
orders and subsequent regulations merely suspended the jurisdiction of federal courts. The
designation of the President's order as temporary or permanent is irrelevant because in either
case the American plaintiffs are prevented from adjudicating claims that are rightly within the
jurisdiction of the international tribunal.
161. See Dames & Moore, 101 S. Ct. at 2986-88. The President's claim settlement authority is
an outgrowth of his executive agreement power. See notes 127-37 and accompanying text supra.
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Moore, asserted that the President may provide for the lump sum settlement
of all the claims by American nationals against a foreign government when it
is necessary to accomplish the foreign policy pursuits of the United States
Government. 6 2  Furthermore, he reasoned that continual congressional ac-
quiescence suggested that Congress supported this practice by the President.
This reasoning, however, is based upon previous claim settlements which
differ in major respects from the present agreement with Iran.6 3 This major
distinction renders impotent Justice Rehnquist's most alluring argument.
The prior claim settlements relied on in Dames & Moore involved the
Litvinov Assignment, which provided for the eventual possession by the
Soviet Union of property owned in the United States by Russian nation-
als. 6 4 As part of a larger effort to normalize diplomatic relations with the
Soviet Union, the Litvinov Assignment recognized the right of the Soviet
Union to nationalize the property of Russian nationals in the United
States. 6 s Significantly, in at least one case involving the Litvinov Assign-
ment, the Supreme Court stated that claims of American citizens had been
paid prior to the Assignment. 66  Conversely, the Iran Accords included the
President's disposition of unsatisfied claims by American citizens. An agree-
ment normalizing domestic relations with the Soviet Union, which did not
deprive American nationals of legitimate individual rights, cannot serve as
precedent for the Iran Accords. Justice Rehnquist ventured too far in equat-
ing nationalization of Russian property with the litigation rights of American
citizens. 6 7 The result is unpersuasive.
162. Id. at 2987.
163. These major distinctions were recognized by Judge Duffy in Marschalk. Marschalk Co.
v. Iran National Airlines Corp., 518 F. Supp. 69, 88-90 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
164. Dames & Moore, 101 S. Ct. at 2988.
165. See United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 211 (1942) (the United States Government,
acting as assignee of the Soviet Government pursuant to the Litvinov Assignment, brought suit to
recover the assets of American branches of Russian firms); See also United States v. Belmont, 301
U.S. 324, 330 (1937).
166. Pink, 315 U.S. at 211, 226.
167. While an evaluation of the purpose and political wisdom of the accords is beyond the
scope of this comment, the striking differences between the Iran Accords and previous claim
settlement agreements are worthy of mention. Because the Litvinov Assignment with the Soviet
Union was required prior to normalization of diplomatic relations, see note 165 and accompany-
ing text supra, the cases that upheld the agreement reflect the gravity of that foreign policy goal.
See Pink, 315 U.S. at 232-33 (recognition of the Soviet Government depended on the Litvinov
Assignment); Belmont, 301 U.S. at 230 (Court took judicial notice that coincident with the
Litvinov Assignment, diplomatic relations with the Soviet government were established). More-
over, since recognition of the Soviet Union had obvious long-term foreign policy implications for
the United States, the courts were more willing to uphold the Litvinov Assignment. Though the
Iran Accords should not be cavalierly dismissed as wholly irrelevant to long-term foreign policy,
it is difficult to view them as little more than a ransom payment for American hostages.
Additionally, the Accords were prompted by a coercive act and thus are not binding under
international law. Article 52 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides: "a
treaty is void if its conclusion has been procured by the threat or use of force in violation of the
principles of international law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations." 8 I.L.M. 679,
698 (1969) (both Iran and the United States adopted this convention).
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In previous instances of presidential claim settlements, the claims by
American nationals against the enemy debtor far exceeded the enemy's prop-
erty in this country.""6 Iran's assets in the United States during President
Carter's freeze, however, were more than adequate to pay all American
claims.16 9  Thus, executive intervention in the Iranian cases cannot be justi-
fied as an attempt to settle the pro rata distribution of a limited amount of
property among American creditors. 70 In many of the claim agreements
relied on in Dames & Moore, the government's involvement was upheld as
necessary to assist the equitable payment of all claims. Through the Iran
Accords, however, President Carter hindered rather than assisted American
plaintiffs in their private controversies with Iran.171
Justice Rehnquist's reliance in Dames & Moore on implicit congressional
acquiescence as a justification for cancellation of American claims is equally
unsupported. It is a fundamental precept of our federal system that the
President may only exercise those powers to which he is entitled by virtue of
the Constitution or explicit legislative enactment. 72  Consequently, the
President cannot justify the use of power by stating that Congress could pass
a law prohibiting his actions if it chose, and that by not doing so Congress
approved of the presidential actions. 73  Indeed, Congress has shown its
dissatisfaction with presidential claim settlements. 174  The enactment of the
168. See, e.g., Codray v. Brownell, 207 F.2d 610, 613 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1953) (citing affidavit of
United States Attorney General stating that claims against Hungary exceed Hungarian assets).
169. The total amount of Iran's assets in the United States exceeded $10 billion. Wall St. J.,
Jan. 20, 1981, at 3, col. 1. Claims against Iran nullified by the Iran Accords were approximately
$6 billion. Washington Post, Oct. 26, 1980, at 23, col. 1.
170. The TWEA has a specific provision for pro rata distribution of claims. 50 U.S.C. app.
§ 34(f)-(g) (1976). Most lump sum settlement agreements of international monetary claims have
returned only a fraction of the amount claimed. Gordon, The Blocking of Iranian Assets, 14
INT'L LAW. 659, 686 (1980). See The Iran Agreements, supra note 22, at 3. In response to
questions by Senator Claiborne Pell, former Secretary of State Edmund Muskie stated, "[t]ypi-
cally, lump-sum settlements have been negotiated at around 40 cents on the dollar .... Id.
171. In Dames & Moore, however, the Solicitor General argued that the American claimants
had an enhanced opportunity to recover because the creation of an international tribunal meant
that Iran could not raise sovereignty defenses. Dames & Moore, 101 S. Ct. at 2990. This is
probably relevant to some of the claims, assuming Iran honors its agreement to abide by the
decisions of the tribunal. It is interesting to note, however, that the Tribunal was still encum-
bered by procedural problems and had not yet heard its first case over a year after the Iran
Accords were signed. N.Y. Times, March 8, 1982, at 7, col. I (midwest ed.).
172. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 585 (1952).
173. This appeared to be Justice Rehnquist's argument in Dames & Moore. He stated: "cru-
cial to our decision today is the conclusion that Congress has implicitly approved the practice of
claim settlement by executive agreement." 101 S. Ct. at 2987.
174. In reaction to a particularly unsatisfactory lump sum agreement, Congress passed the
Gavel Amendment to the Trade Reform Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2438 (1976). According to the
Act, "[t]he United States shall not release any gold belonging to Czechoslovakia... until [such]
release has been approved by the Congress." Id. See Note, The Gavel Amendment to the Trade
Reform Act of 1974: Congress Checkmates a Presidential Lump Sum Agreement, 69 AM. J. INT'L
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FSIA, IEEPA, and NEA-acts which "occup[y] the field" of possible presi-
dential involvement with foreign economic controversies-have noticeably
failed to grant presidential authority to suspend claims. 175  Even if implicit
congressional acquiescence could authorize presidential claim settlement au-
thority, such implicit acquiescence is not apparent in these cases. As one
commentator has argued, it would have been impossible for Congress to have
implicitly approved of presidential actions like the Iran Accords because
previous instances of presidential claim settlements are so different that they
are simply not precedent. 76
The Dames & Moore Court also relied upon the IEEPA and the Hostage
Act of 1868 to uphold the President's cancellation of claims. Although Justice
Rehnquist admitted that neither the IEEPA nor the Hostage Act was a direct
authorization -for usurpation of jurisdiction, he nonetheless believed they
were relevant expressions of a willingness by Congress to grant the President
a free hand in dealing with crises of the Iran variety. 77  These statutes,
however, provide only weak support for that argument. In fact, the IEEPA
was meant to limit the President's power to interfere in non-war crises.7 8
Additionally, the Hostage Act, which provides: "The president shall use
such means not amounting to acts of war" to effectuate the release of
hostages, 79 was merely a demonstration of congressional indignation over
L. 837 (1975) [hereinafter cited as The Gavel Amendment]. The conclusion of the note is that the
Gavel Amendment indicates that the executive should return to the practice of using treaties
rather than executive agreements to provide for the settlement of claims. Id. at 844-47.
175. The Supreme Court, 1980 Term, 95 HARv. L. REV. 191, 196 (1981).
176. Id. at 196-98. The settlements cited as precedent were either executed by formal treaties,
compensated claims which could not have been heard by United States courts, or were concur-
rent with the recognition of another government, Id.
177. Dames & Moore, 101 S. Ct. at 2986.
178. See notes 89-96 and accompanying text supra. To support his contrary statements Justice
Rehnquist quoted from the legislative history of IEEPA, out of its proper context. According to
the Justice, "Congress stressed that 'nothing in this Act is intended to interfere with the authority
of the President to [block assets] or to impede the settlement of claims of United States citizens
against foreign countries.' " Dames & Moore, 101 S. Ct. at 2988. In its proper context, however,
this sentence refers to section 207 of the Act which is a "grandfather clause" for "emergencies"
currently in progress. See S. REP. No. 466, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 6, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 4540, 4544. Thus, the IEEPA was intended to give the President a free hand
with regard to assets already under government control. If the quoted phrase was intended to
apply to the entire Act, it would have been put under the "Purpose of the Bill" section. This
opening section states: "The purpose of the bill is to revise and delimit the President's authority
to regulate international economic transactions ... " S. RE1,. No. 466, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 6,
reprinted in [1978] U.S. COOE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4540, 4541.
Any general congressional intent implied from IEEPA must be measured against the specific
FSIA authorization to the courts to hear claims by the American claimants. See notes 182-86 and
accompanying text infra. Whereas the IEEPA was practically a reenactment of the TWEA, the
FSIA was a bold new measure enacted to reallocate power from the President to the courts.
Insofar as the two statutes conflict, more weight must be given to the specific over the general
statute. See Clifford F. MacEvoy Co. v. United States, 322 U.S. 102, 107 (1944); Missouri v.
Ross, 299 U.S. 72, 76 (1936).
179. 22 U.S.C. § 1732 (1976).
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the forced repatriation of naturalized American citizens travelling abroad-
a situation far different than the freezing of assets.180 In effect, Justice
Rehnquist reasoned that the President may mortgage the country to do the
Ayatollah's bidding. A more judicious approach would view such vague
legislation of centuries past merely as permission for the President to act in
ways that are otherwise specifically authorized by Congress or the Constitu-
tion. "81
Finally, the President's broad discretion in foreign affairs, together with
any remaining precedential value of prior claim settlements, must be tem-
pered by a consideration of the FSIA's restrictions on executive branch
involvement in suits against foreign countries. Since the FSIA forbids the
State Department from deciding whether a foreign sovereign is subject to
American courts, 1 2 it is no longer possible for the executive to remove cases
from those courts after the decision to hear a claim has been made. 8 3 Any
authority derived from previous claim settlements has been diminished by
Congress' decision to have these claims heard by the courts.8 4
The case law and statutes by which the President attempted to justify
intervention in the Iran cases are of limited value. If the President's actions
180. Dames & Moore, 101 S. Ct. at 2985.
181. American Int'l Group v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 657 F.2d 430, 453 (D.C. Cir. 1981)
(Mikva, J., separate statement). See Also Hostage Agreement, supra note 122, at 850, which
states that the Act intends that the "President ... do all that he can within his already-existing
powers." Id.
182. The purpose of FSIA was to de-politicize grants of immunity and allow courts to make
the immunity determination. HousE REP RT ON FSIA, supra note 1, at 7. Cf. S. REP. No. 1310,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1976) (State Department's involvement created uncertainty for private
parties dealing with foreign governments), reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
6604.
183. See Carl, Suing Foreign Governments in American Courts: The United States Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act in Practice, 33 S.W.L.J. 1009, 1063 (1979) (in the hypothetical
situation that American hostages are being held by a foreign state that wishes to trade them for
the dismissal of pending litigation in the United States against that state, the Executive would be
prohibited under the FSIA from accepting the bargain). Dellapenna, Suing Foreign Govern-
ments and their Corporations: Sovereign Immunity: Part V, 85 COLUM. L.J. 497, 502 (1980) (a
literal reading of FSIA prohibited the state Department from dismissing Iranian claims to settle
the hostage crisis).
In another analysis of the Iran Accords, it was stated that "[c]ontrol over the domestic
disposition of a claim is a necessary corollary to an ability to settle it exclusively within the
international realm; if the President could not protect foreign nations from suit in American
courts, his claims to control through [his claim settlement authority] would be largely empty."
Hostage Agreement, supra note 122, at 863. It is probable that the FSIA would still allow the
President to settle claims in "truly extraordinary situations .. " Id. at 869. War would
constitute such a situation; paying ransom, however, would not. This author went on to
conclude, however, that the President was within his authority in settling claims against Iran.
184. Earlier versions of FSIA would have made it possible for executive authority to alter the
FSIA. The rejection of these versions suggest that Congress meant to limit presidential interven-
tion. Hostage Agreement, supra note 122, at 867 n.306 (citing Jurisdiction of United States
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are to be upheld, it must be by virtue of his vast power to single-handedly
manipulate the foreign affairs of the United States. This undefined authority
is constrained by the FSIA as well as article III of the Constitution which
vests the judicial power in the courts.'8 5 The Supreme Court has concluded
that even though the consequences of the Iran Accords extend far into the
domestic sphere, it is a legitimate flexing of the President's foreign policy
muscle. '8
CONCLUSION
Since the enactment of the FSIA, American businesses dealing with foreign
governments are to be afforded judicial treatment guided by this statute
rather than by the political whims of the State Department. American
nationals are able to determine whether they should risk doing business with
a foreign sovereign based on such factors as whether a treaty exists between
the United States and the sovereign that waives immunity, and whether the
intended business would be of a commercial nature. The outcome is not as
predictable, however, in instances involving massive repudiation of contracts
by a hostile foreign government. The scope of presidential power in foreign
affairs buttressed by the IEEPA exceeds, in most instances, the rights of
individual creditors based on the FSIA.'l 7 American creditors in such situa-
tions must rely on the possibility of obtaining prejudgment attachments. The
effectiveness of this approach is diminished, however, by the courts' hesi-
tancy towards issuing writs of attachment and the difficulty of sustaining
these writs against the power of the President in conducting foreign affairs.
Creditors are forced, therefore, to rely on the ability of the Executive to work
out equitable alternatives to those provided by the FSIA.
The distinctions between the TWEA and its successor the IEEPA exem-
plify the inability of Congress to curtail the power of the President effec-
tively, while still allowing him sufficient flexibility to address unforeseen
contingencies. If the President's authority is to be subject to reasonable
limitations, the courts must exercise their judicial review power. Alterna-
tively, the Congress should define, more precisely, the President's role in
disputes between American concerns and foreign states. The nullification of
prejudgment attachments and the cancellation of federal court jurisdiction in
the Iran cases has resulted in an amplification of the President's authority. If
this extension of executive power is justified as a requirement of the moment,
Courts in Suits Against Foreign States: Hearings Before Subcomm. on Administrative Law and
Governmental Relations of the House Comm. on the judiciary, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 52 (1976)).
185. U.S. CONST. art. III, §§ 1, 2.
186. Dames & Moore, 101 S. Ct. at 2972.
187. With the increasing importance of international trade and multi-national corporations
that are able to fend for themselves, there is hope that unwarranted governmental intervention
could be curbed. See Iran Symposium, supra note 122, at iv (foreward by A. Swan) (the
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there is an inherent danger that, under a similar rationale, even more
adventurous presidential initiatives might follow."8 The increasing impor-
tance of international trade demands a predictable and, therefore, more
principled approach by the United States.
James T. Rohifing
government's interference in the Iran cases indicated a return to the time when only nations, not
individuals, were a proper part), for international law). Cf. Higgins, Conceptual Thinking
About the Individual In International Law, 24 N.Y.L.S. REV. 11 (1978). According to this
author, the rights of individuals in the international forum are often different from the interests
of nations and the individual's "aspirations, problems, anxieties and feelings" demand increasing
respect. Id. at 29.
188. President Ronald Reagan has recently invoked the TWEA to block the distribution in the
United States of newspapers from Cuba. This is the first time the TWEA has been used to block
the flow of printed information. N.Y. Times, Nov. 25, 1981, at 9, col. 3 (midwest ed.).
